eBay Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs Based on Googleads.g.doubleclick.net

ebay-logo

eBay Covert Redirect Vulnerability Based on Googleads.g.doubleclick.net

(1) WebSite:
ebay.com



“eBay Inc. (stylized as ebay, formerly eBay) is an American multinational corporation and e-commerce company, providing consumer to consumer & business to consumer sales services via Internet. It is headquartered in San Jose, California. eBay was founded by Pierre Omidyar in 1995, and became a notable success story of the dot-com bubble. Today, it is a multi-billion dollar business with operations localized in over thirty countries.

 

The company manages eBay.com, an online auction and shopping website in which people and businesses buy and sell a broad variety of goods and services worldwide. In addition to its auction-style sales, the website has since expanded to include “Buy It Now” shopping; shopping by UPC, ISBN, or other kind of SKU (via Half.com); online classified advertisements (via Kijiji or eBay Classifieds); online event ticket trading (via StubHub); online money transfers (via PayPal) and other services.” (Wikipedia)

 



(2) Vulnerability Description:

eBay web application has a computer cyber security problem. Hacker can exploit it by Covert Redirect attacks.

The vulnerability occurs at “ebay.com/rover” page with “&mpre” parameter, i.e.

http://rover.ebay.com/rover/1/711-67261-24966-0/2?mtid=691&kwid=1&crlp=1_263602&itemid=370825182102&mpre=http://www.google.com

The vulnerability can be attacked without user login. Tests were performed on Firefox (26.0) in Ubuntu (12.04) and IE (9.0.15) in Windows 7.


 

 

 

(2.1) When a user is redirected from eBay to another site, eBay will check whether the redirected URL belongs to domains in eBay’s whitelist, e.g.
google.com

If this is true, the redirection will be allowed.

 

However, if the URLs in a redirected domain have open URL redirection vulnerabilities themselves, a user could be redirected from eBay to a vulnerable URL in that domain first and later be redirected from this vulnerable site to a malicious site. This is as if being redirected from eBay directly.

 

One of the vulnerable domain is,
http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net (Google’s Ad system)

 

 

 

(2.2) Use one of webpages for the following tests. The webpage address is “http://itinfotech.tumblr.com/“. We can suppose that this webpage is malicious.

 

Vulnerable URL:

POC:

 

 

Poc Video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a4H-u17Y9ks

 

Blog Detail:
http://securityrelated.blogspot.com/2014/11/ebay-covert-redirect-vulnerability.html



 

 



(3) What is Covert Redirect?

Covert Redirect is a class of security bugs disclosed in May 2014. It is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without sufficient validation. This often makes use of Open Redirect and XSS vulnerabilities in third-party applications.

 

Covert Redirect is also related to single sign-on. It is known by its influence on OAuth and OpenID. Hacker may use it to steal users’ sensitive information. Almost all OAuth 2.0 and OpenID providers worldwide are affected. Covert Redirect was found and dubbed by a Mathematics PhD student Wang Jing from School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

After Covert Redirect was published, it is kept in some common databases such as SCIP, OSVDB, Bugtraq, and X-Force. Its scipID is 13185, while OSVDB reference number is 106567. Bugtraq ID: 67196. X-Force reference number is 93031.

 

 

 

Discover and Reporter:
Wang Jing, Division of Mathematical Sciences (MAS), School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (SPMS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. (@justqdjing)
http://tetraph.com/wangjing/

Falha de segurança afeta logins de Facebook, Google e Microsoft

internet connection concept, 3d generated image

Um estudante de PHD de Singapura, Wang Jing, identificou a falha, chamada de “Covert Redirect”, que consegue usar domínios reais de sites para verificação de páginas de login falsas, enganando os internautas.

 

Os cibercriminosos podem criar links maliciosos para abrir janelas pop-up do Facebook pedindo que o tal aplicativo seja autorizado. Caso seja realizada esta sincronização, os dados pessoais dos usuários serão passados para os hackers.

 

Wang afirma que já entrou em contato com o Facebook, porém recebeu uma resposta de que “entende os riscos de estar associado ao OAuth 2.0″ e que corrigir a falha “é algo que não pode ser feito por enquanto”.

 

O Google afirmou que o problema está sendo rastreado, o LinkedIn publicou nota em que garante que já tomou medidas para evitar que a falha seja explorada, e a Microsoft negou que houvesse vulnerabilidade em suas páginas, apenas nas de terceiros.

 

A recomendação do descobridor da falha para os internautas é que evitem fazer o login com dados de confirmação de Facebook, Google ou qualquer outro serviço sem terem total certeza de que estão em um ambiente seguro.

 

 

Especialistas: erro é difícil de corrigir

O site CNET ouviu dois especialistas em segurança virtual sobre o assunto. Segundo Jeremiah Grossman, fundador e CEO interino da WhiteHat Security, afirma que a falha “não é fácil de corrigir”. Segundo Chris Wysopal, diretor da Veracode, a falha pode enganar muita gente.

 

“A confiança que os usuários dão ao Facebook e outros serviços que usam OAuth pode tornar mais fácil para os hackers enganarem as pessoas para que elas acabem dando suas informações pessoais a ele”, afirma Wsyopal.

 

 

 

notícias relacionadas:

Mail.ru Online Service OAuth 2.0 Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)

mail-ru_1882101c

 

Mail.ru Online Service OAuth 2.0 Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)

 

(1) Domain:
mail.ru

 

 

“Mail.Ru Group (London Stock Exchange listed since November 5, 2010) is a Russian Internet company. It was started in 1998 as an e-mail service and went on to become a major corporate figure in the Russian-speaking segment of the Internet. As of 2013, according to comScore, websites owned by Mail.ru collectively had the largest audience in Russia and captured the most screen time. Mail.Ru’s sites reach approximately 86% of Russian Internet users on a monthly basis and the company is in the top 5 of largest Internet companies, based on the number of total pages viewed. Mail.ru controls the 3 largest Russian social networking sites. It operates the second and third most popular Russian social networking sites, Odnoklassniki and Moy Mir, respectively. Mail.ru holds 100% of shares of Russia’s most popular social network VKontakte and minority stakes in Qiwi, formerly OE Investments (15.04%). It also operates two instant messaging networks (Mail.Ru Agent and ICQ), an e-mail service and Internet portal Mail.ru, as well as a number of online games.” (Wikipedia)

 

 

“Mail.Ru — крупный коммуникационный портал российского Интернета, ежемесячная аудитория которого по данным на октябрь 2012 года превышает 31,9 млн человек. Ресурс занимает 52-е место по популярности в мире и 5-е — в России. Число работников составляет 2800 человек. Ресурс принадлежит инвестиционной группе Mail.Ru Group.” (Ru.Wikipedia)

 

 

 

 

(2) Vulnerability Description:

Mail.ru web application has a computer security problem. Hacker can exploit it by Covert Redirect cyber attacks.

 

The vulnerabilities can be attacked without user login. Tests were performed on Microsoft IE (10.0.9200.16750) of Windows 8, Mozilla Firefox (34.0) & Google Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0 ubuntu0.14.04.1.1064 (64-bit) of Ubuntu (14.04),Apple Safari 6.1.6 of Mac OS X Lion 10.7.

 

 


(2.1) Vulnerability Detail:

Mail.Ru’s OAuth system is susceptible to Attacks. More specifically, the authentication of parameter “&redirct_uri” in OAuth system is insufficient. It can be misused to design Open Redirect Attacks to Mail.Ru.

 

At the same time, it can be used to collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users by using the following parameters (sensitive information is contained in HTTP header.),

“&response_type”=code,token…

“&scope”=get_user_info…

 

It increases the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks to third-party websites, too.

 

 

The vulnerabilities occurs at page “/oauth/authorize?” with parameter “&redirect_uri”, e.g.
https://connect.mail.ru/oauth/authorize?response_type=token&client_id=667668&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fmy.kp.ru%2Flogin.do%3FreturnUrl%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.tetraph.com%252Fessayjeans%252Fpoems%252Fdistance.html [1]

 

 

Before acceptance of third-party application:

 

When a logged-in Mail.Ru user clicks the URL ([1]) above, he/she will be asked for consent as in whether to allow a third-party website to receive his/her information. If the user clicks OK, he/she will be then redirected to the URL assigned to the parameter “&redirect_uri”.

 

If a user has not logged onto Mail.Ru and clicks the URL ([1]) above, the same situation will happen upon login.

 

After acceptance of third-party application:

 

A logged-in Mail.Ru user would no longer be asked for consent and could be redirected to a webpage controlled by the attacker when he/she clicks the URL ([1]).

 

For a user who has not logged in, the attack could still be completed after a pop-up page that prompts him/her to log in.

 

 

 

(2.1.1) Mail.Ru would normally allow all the URLs that belong to the domain of an authorized third-party website. However, these URLs could be prone to manipulation. For example, the “&redirect_uri” parameter in the URLs is supposed to be set by the third-party websites, but an attacker could change its value to make Attacks.

 

Hence, a user could be redirected from Mail.Ru to a vulnerable URL in that domain first and later be redirected from this vulnerable site to a malicious site unwillingly. This is as if the user is redirected from Mail.Ru directly. The number of Mail.Ru’s OAuth client websites is so huge that such Attacks could be commonplace.

 

Before acceptance of the third-party application, Mail.Ru’s OAuth system makes the redirects appear more trustworthy and could potentially increase the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks of third-party website.

 

Once the user accepts the application, the attackers could completely bypass Mail.Ru’s authentication system and attack more easily.

 

 

 

(2.2) Used one of webpages for the following tests. The webpage is “http://biboying.lofter.com/“. We can suppose it is malicious and contains code that collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users.

 

Below is an example of a vulnerable third-party domain:
kp.ru

 

 

Vulnerable URL in this domain:
http://my.kp.ru/login.do?returnUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tetraph.com%2Fessayjeans%2Fpoems%2Fdistance.html

 

Vulnerable URL from Mail.Ru that is related to kp.ru:
https://connect.mail.ru/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=667668&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fmy.kp.ru%2Flogin%2Fmailru.do%3FreturnUrl%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fizh.kp.ru

 

POC:
https://connect.mail.ru/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=667668&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fmy.kp.ru%2Flogin.do%3FreturnUrl%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.tetraph.com%252Fessayjeans%252Fpoems%252Fdistance.html

 

 

POC Video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yEB58S8WBI

 

Blog Detail:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/mailru-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html

 

 

(3) What is Covert Redirect?

Covert Redirect is a class of security bugs disclosed in May 2014. It is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without sufficient validation. This often makes use of Open Redirect and XSS (Cross-site Scripting) vulnerabilities in third-party applications.

 

Covert Redirect is also related to single sign-on. It is known by its influence on OAuth and OpenID. Hacker may use it to steal users’ sensitive information. Almost all OAuth 2.0 and OpenID providers worldwide are affected. Covert Redirect can work together with CSRF (Cross-site Request Forgery) as well. After Covert Redirect was published, it is kept in some common databases such as SCIP, OSVDB, Bugtraq, and X-Force. Its scipID is 13185, while OSVDB reference number is 106567. Bugtraq ID: 67196. X-Force reference number is 93031.



 

Discover and Reporter:
Wang Jing, Division of Mathematical Sciences (MAS), School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (SPMS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. (@justqdjing)
http://tetraph.com/wangjing/

 

Related Articles:
http://tetraph.com/security/covert-redirect/mail-ru-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability/
http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/covert-redirect/mail-ru-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability/
https://twitter.com/essayjeans/status/558974764958486528
https://tetraph.wordpress.com/2014/07/11/mail-ru-security-bugs/
https://computertechhut.wordpress.com/2014/07/05/mail-ru-security-bugs/
http://securityrelated.blogspot.com/2014/08/mailru-website-attack.html
http://whitehatpost.lofter.com/post/1cc773c8_706b6bf
http://ithut.tumblr.com/post/119493112323/securitypost-sicherheitslucke-in-oauth-2-0-und
http://tetraph.blog.163.com/blog/static/23460305120144611948109/
http://computerobsess.blogspot.com/2014/08/mailru-website-attack.html

Sicherheitslücke in OAuth 2.0 und OpenID gefunden

covert_redirect3

Wang Jing, Student an der Nanyang Technological University in Singapur, hat nach dem Bekanntwerden des OpenSSL-Heartbleed-Lecks, eine weitere schwere Sicherheitslücke entdeckt, diesmal in den Authentifizierungsmethoden OAuth 2.0 und OpenID. Die als “Covert Redirect” (“Heimliche Umleitung”) benannte Sicherheitslücke ermöglicht es Angreifern, dem Nutzer einen echt aussehenden Login-Screen unterzujubeln und sich so Zugriff auf die bereitgestellten Daten zu verschaffen. Das gefährliche daran: Die Sicherheitslücke besitzt – anders als bisher bekannte Fishing-Versuche – eine legitime Domainadresse, kann also über einen Blick in die URL-Zeile des Browsers nicht oder nur sehr schwer entlarvt werden. Auf OAuth 2.0 und OpenID bieten inzwischen zahlreiche Webdienste um einen direkten Login in andere Dienste und Apps zu ermöglichen, darunter auch Google, Facebook, Microsoft und Co.

 

So ist es möglich, dem Nutzer eine Mail mit einem speziell präparierten Link zukommen zu lassen, ein Klick auf diesen öffnet eben wie gesagt eine legitime Adresse samt entsprechendem Logo. Autorisiert der Nutzer dann diese Anfrage und loggt sich in den Dienst ein, so werden die Daten nicht an die vermeintliche App weitergeleitet, sondern gelangen eben in den Besitz des Angreifers. Je nachdem, welche Daten abfragt werden, bekommt dieser somit also E-Mail-Adresse, Geburtsdatum, Kontaktlisten und dergleichen. Ebenso ist es möglich, den Nutzer nach dem Login auf eine beliebige Webseite, welche unter Umständen Malware verbreitet, weiterzuleiten.



covert-redirect-11

 

covert-redirect-12


Die Lösung des Problems könnte aber – wenn es überhaupt einmal eine geben sollte – eine langwierige Sache sein. Wang Jing hat bereits etliche größere Anbieter der Loginmethoden angeschrieben und über die gefundene Sicherheitslücke aufgeklärt, hierbei gab es jedoch unterschiedliche Aussagen. Im Hause Google beobachtet man das Problem, Microsoft ist sich keiner Schuld bewusst und schiebt die Sicherheitslücke an Drittanbieter ab. Lediglich Facebook scheint hier ehrlich zu sein und gibt an, dass es sich dabei um ein grundsätzliches Problem von OAuth 2.0 und OpenID handelt – möchte man nicht eine umfangreiche Whitelist mit sämtlichen nicht-schädlichen Apps pflegen, ist die Sicherheitslücke nicht “mal eben so” zu beheben. Im Grunde dürften sich sämtliche Gegenmaßnahmen negativ auf die Nutzererfahrung auswirken, was natürlich keiner der Dienste in Kauf nehmen möchte – und so bleibt es hierbei scheinbar beim “kleineren Übel” für die Anbieter.

So bleibt eigentlich nur die Möglichkeit, auf OAuth 2.0 oder OpenID als Login-Methode für Drittanbieter Dienste und Apps zu verzichten oder genauestens darauf zu achten, auf was man klickt. Hat man keine explizite Autorisierung angestoßen, sollte man die geöffneten Tabs umgehend schließen und darauf hoffen, dass sich nicht doch irgendwo ein falscher Link eingepfercht hat.



Quelle:
http://www.blogtogo.de/sicherheitsluecke-in-oauth-2-0-und-openid-gefunden/




兩款互聯網登錄系統曝出重大漏洞 黑客可用知名網站釣魚 – Covert Redirect

phishing

 

繼OpenSSL漏洞後,開源安全軟件再曝安全漏洞。新加坡南洋理工大學研究人員,物理和數學科學學院博士生王晶 (Wang Jing) 發現,OAuth 2.0, OpenID 授權接口的網站存隱蔽重定向漏洞、英文名為“Covert Redirect”。

 

攻擊者創建壹個使用真實站點地址的彈出式登錄窗口——而不是使用壹個假的域名——以引誘上網者輸入他們的個人信息。

 

黑客可利用該漏洞給釣魚網站“變裝”,用知名大型網站鏈接引誘用護登錄釣魚網站,壹旦用護訪問釣魚網站並成功登六授權,黑客即可讀取其在網站上存儲的私密信息。

 

騰訊,阿裏巴巴,QQ、新浪微博、淘寶網,支付寶,網易,PayPal, eBay, Amazon, Facebook、Google, LinkedIn, Yahoo, VK.com, Microsoft, Mail.ru, Github, WordPress 等國內外大量知名網站受影響。

 

鑒於OAuth和OpenID被廣泛用於各大公司——如微軟、Facebook、Google、以及 LinkedIn——Wang表示他已經向這些公司已經了匯報。Wang聲稱,微軟已經給出了答復,調查並證實該問題出在第三方系統,而不是該公司的自 有 站點。Facebook也表示,“短期內仍無法完成完成這兩個問題的修復工作,只得迫使每個應用程序平臺采用白名單”。至於Google,預計該公司 會追 蹤OpenID的問題;而LinkedIn則聲稱它將很快在博客中說明這壹問題。

 

OAuth 是壹個被廣泛應用的開放登六協議,允許用護讓第三方應用訪問該用護在某壹網站上存儲的私密的信息(如照片,視頻,聯系人列表),而無需將用護名和密碼提供給第三方應用。這次曝出的漏洞,可將Oauth2.0的使用方(第三方網站)的回跳域名劫持到惡意網站去,黑客利用XSS漏洞攻擊就能隨意操作被授權的帳號,讀取用護的隱私信息。像騰訊、新浪微博等社交網站壹般對登六回調地址沒有任何限制,極易遭黑客利用。

 

 

 

相關資料,
http://www.cnet.com/news/serious-security-flaw-in-oauth-and-openid-discovered/
http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/after-heartbleed-major-covert-redirect-flaw-threatens-oauth-openid-and-the-internet-222945.html
http://tetraph.com/covert_redirect/oauth2_openid_covert_redirect.html
http://techxplore.com/news/2014-05-math-student-oauth-openid-vulnerability.html
http://phys.org/news/2014-05-math-student-oauth-openid-vulnerability.html
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/facebook-google-covert-redirect-flaw,news-18726.html
http://news.yahoo.com/facebook-google-users-threatened-security-192547549.html
http://thehackernews.com/2014/05/nasty-covert-redirect-vulnerability.html
http://www.scmagazine.com/covert-redirect-vulnerability-impacts-oauth-20-openid/article/345407/
http://blog.kaspersky.com/facebook-openid-oauth-vulnerable/
http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/05/05/facebook-google-users-threatened-by-new-security-flaw/
http://network.pconline.com.cn/471/4713896.html
http://media.sohu.com/20140504/n399096249.shtml/
http://it.people.com.cn/n/2014/0504/c1009-24969253.html
http://www.cnbeta.com/articles/288503.htm
http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/computer-security/oauth-2-0-and-openid-covert-redirect/
http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=0v9QZaGB09ePxHb70bzgWqlW-C9jieVguuDObtvJ_6WFY3h2vWnnjNDy4-jliDmqbT47SmdGS1_pZ4BbGN4Re_
http://itinfotech.tumblr.com/post/118850342491/covert-redirect
http://tetraph.com/covert_redirect/
http://ittechnology.lofter.com/post/1cfbf60d_6f09f58
https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%9A%B1%E8%94%BD%E9%87%8D%E5%AE%9A%E5%90%91%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E
http://www.baike.com/wiki/%E9%9A%90%E8%94%BD%E9%87%8D%E5%AE%9A%E5%90%91%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E
http://www.csdn.net/article/2014-05-04/2819588

 

 

Alibaba Alipay Online Website OAuth 2.0 Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)

Alipay-Wallet-Reaches-190-Mn-Annual-Active-Users

 

Alibaba Alipay Online Website OAuth 2.0 Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)

 

 

(1) Domain:
alipay.com

 

“Alipay.com is a third-party online payment platform with no transaction fees. It was launched in China in 2004 by Alibaba Group and its founder Jack Ma. According to analyst research report, Alipay has the biggest market share in China with 300 million users and control of just under half of China’s online payment market in February 2014. According to Credit Suisse, the total value of online transactions in China grew from an insignificant size in 2008 to around RMB 4 trillion (US$660 billion) in 2012. Alipay provides an escrow service, in which consumers can verify whether they are happy with goods they have bought before releasing money to the seller. This service was offered for what the company says are China’s weak consumer protection laws, which have reduced consumer confidence in C2C and even B2C quality control.” (Wikipedia)

 

 

 

(2) Vulnerability Description:

Alipay web application has a computer security problem. Hacker can exploit it by Covert Redirect cyber attacks.

 

The vulnerabilities can be attacked without user login. Tests were performed on Microsoft IE (10.0.9200.16750) of Windows 8, Mozilla Firefox (34.0) & Google Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0 ubuntu0.14.04.1.1064 (64-bit) of Ubuntu (14.04),Apple Safari 6.1.6 of Mac OS X Lion 10.7.


 
 
 
(2.1) Vulnerability Detail:

Alipay’s OAuth 2.0 system is susceptible to Attacks. More specifically, the authentication of parameter “&goto” in OAuth 2.0 system is insufficient. It can be misused to design Open Redirect Attacks to Alipay.

At the same time, it can be used to collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users (sensitive information is contained in HTTP header.).

It increases the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks to third-party websites, too.

Before acceptance of third-party application:

When a logged-in Alipay user clicks the URL ([1]) above, he/she will be asked for consent as in whether to allow a third-party website to receive his/her information. If the user clicks OK, he/she will be then redirected to the URL assigned to the parameter “&goto”.

If a user has not logged onto Alipay and clicks the URL ([1]) above, the same situation will happen upon login.

After acceptance of third-party application:

A logged-in Alipay user would no longer be asked for consent and could be redirected to a webpage controlled by the attacker when he/she clicks the URL ([1]).

For a user who has not logged in, the attack could still be completed after a pop-up page that prompts him/her to log in.

 
 
 

(2.1.1) Before acceptance of the third-party application, Alipay’s OAuth 2.0 system makes the redirects appear more trustworthy and could potentially increase the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks of third-party website.

Once the user accepts the application, the attackers could completely bypass Alipay’s authentication system and attack more easily.

Used one of webpages for the following tests. The webpage is “http://lifegreen.lofter.com/“. Can suppose it is malicious and contains code that collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users.

 

Below is an example of a vulnerable third-party domain:
cjcp.com.cn

If users click URL [2], attacks happen.




POC Video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhqwC9RQl44


Blog Detail:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/alibaba-alipays-oauth-20-covert.html






 

(3) What is Covert Redirect?

Covert Redirect is a class of security bugs disclosed in May 2014. It is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without sufficient validation. This often makes use of Open Redirect and XSS (Cross-site Scripting) vulnerabilities in third-party applications.

Covert Redirect is also related to single sign-on. It is known by its influence on OAuth and OpenID. Hacker may use it to steal users’ sensitive information. Almost all OAuth 2.0 and OpenID providers worldwide are affected. Covert Redirect can work together with CSRF (Cross-site Request Forgery) as well. After Covert Redirect was published, it is kept in some common databases such as SCIP, OSVDB, Bugtraq, and X-Force. Its scipID is 13185, while OSVDB reference number is 106567. Bugtraq ID: 67196. X-Force reference number is 93031.



Discover and Reporter:
Wang Jing, Division of Mathematical Sciences (MAS), School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (SPMS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
(@justqdjing)
http://tetraph.com/wangjing/










Related Articles:
http://tetraph.com/security/covert-redirect/alibaba-alipays-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-information-leakage-open-redirect/
http://securityrelated.blogspot.com/2014/07/alibaba-alipay-bug.html
http://whitehatpost.lofter.com/post/1cc773c8_72e71f9
https://vulnerabilitypost.wordpress.com/2014/06/02/alibaba-alipay-exploit/
https://twitter.com/yangziyou/status/614368472705818624
blog.163.com/tetraph/blog/static/2346030512014471384217
http://whitehatview.tumblr.com/post/119488487851/securitypost-itinfotech-falha-de-seguranca#notes
http://computerobsess.blogspot.com/2014/07/alibaba-alipay-bug.html
https://computertechhut.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/alibaba-alipay-exploit/
http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/covert-redirect/alibaba-alipays-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-information-leakage-open-redirect/

 

 

 


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阿里巴巴 支付宝 网站 OAuth 2.0 隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络安全漏洞 (信息泄漏 & 公开重定向)





(1) 域名:
alipay.com


” 支付宝(中国)网络技术有限公司是国内领先的第三方支付平台,致力于提供“简单、安全、快速”的支付解决方案。支付宝公司从2004年建立开始,始终以 “信任”作为产品和服务的核心。旗下有“支付宝”与“支付宝钱包”两个独立品牌。自2014年第二季度开始成为当前全球最大的移动支付厂商。支付宝主要提 供支付及理财服务。包括网购担保交易、网络支付、转账、信用卡还款、手机充值、水电煤缴费、个人理财等多个领域。在进入移动支付领域后,为零售百货、电影 院线、连锁商超和出租车等多个行业提供服务。还推出了余额宝等理财服务。支付宝与国内外180多家银行以及VISA、MasterCard国际组织等机构 建立战略合作关系,成为金融机构在电子支付领域最为信任的合作伙伴。” (百度百科)







(2) 漏洞描述:

阿里巴巴 支付宝网站有有一个计算机安全问题,黑客可以对它进行隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络攻击。



这 个漏洞不需要用户登录,测试是基于微软 Windows 8 的 IE (10.0.9200.16750); Ubuntu (14.04) 的 Mozilla 火狐 (Firefox 34.0) 和 谷歌 Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0; 以及苹果 OS X Lion 10.7 的 Safari 6.16。

 

 

 

 

(2.1) 漏洞细节:

Alipay 的 OAuth 2.0 系统可能遭到攻击。更确切地说, Alipay 对 OAuth 2.0 系统的 parameter “&goto“ 验证不够充分。可以用来构造对 Alipay 的 URL跳转 攻击。

 

 

与此同时,这个漏洞可以用来收集第三方 App 和 用户 的敏感信息(敏感信息包含在 HTTP header里),

它也增加了对第三方网站 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。

 

漏洞地点 “login/express.htm?”,参数”&goto”, e.g.

https://auth.alipay.com/login/express.htm?goto=https%3A%2F%2Fmemberexprod.alipay.com%2Fauthorize%2FuserAuthQuickLoginAction.htm%3Fe_i_i_d%3D41da904223e68d291bfb0eecbff264e1 [1]

 

同意三方 App 前:

 

当一个已经登录的 Alipay 用户点击上面的 URL ([1]), 对话框会询问他是否接受第三方 App 接收他的信息。如果同意,他会被跳转到 参数 “&goto” 的 URL。

 

如果没有登录的Alipay 用户点击 URL ([1]), 他登录后会发生同样的事情。

 

同意三方 App 后:

 

已经登录的 Alipay 用户 不会再被询问是否接受 三方 App。当他点击 URL ([1]) 时,他会被直接跳转到攻击者控制的页面。

 

如果 Alipay 用户没有登录,攻击依然可以在要求他登录的Alipay的对话框被确认后完成(这个过程不会提示任何和三方 App 有关的内容)

 

 

 

(2.1.1) 因为 Alipay 的 OAuth 2.0 客户很多,这样的攻击可以很常见。

 

在同意三方 App 之前,Alipay 的 OAuth 2.0 让用户更容易相信被跳转的页面是安全的。这增加了三方 App 被 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。

 

同意三方 App 后, 攻击者可以完全绕过 Alipay 的 URL跳转 验证系统。

 

用了一个页面进行了测试, 页面是 “http://canghaixiao.tumblr.com/“. 可以假定它是有害的,并且含有收集三方 App 和用户敏感信息的 code。

 

下面是一个有漏洞的三方 domain:
cjcp.com.cn

 

这个 domain 有漏洞的 URL:
http://uc.cjcp.com.cn/?m=pay&a=login&furl=http%3A%2F%2Ftetraph.com%2Fessayjeans%2Foutings%2F%25E5%2590%25AC%25E6%25B5%25B7.html

 

攻击者在浏览器输入 URL,
http://uc.cjcp.com.cn/?m=pay&a=login&furl=http%3A%2F%2Ftetraph.com%2Fessayjeans%2Foutings%2F%25E5%2590%25AC%25E6%25B5%25B7.html

 

 

然后,攻击者可以得到 URL,

https://auth.alipay.com/login/express.htm?goto=https%3A%2F%2Fmemberexprod.alipay.com%2Fauthorize%2FuserAuthQuickLoginAction.htm%3Fe_i_i_d%3D41da904223e68d291bfb0eecbff264e1 [2]

 

如果用户点击 URL [2], 攻击发生。

 


POC 视频:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhqwC9RQl44

 

 

 

博客细节:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/alibaba-alipays-oauth-20-covert.html

 

 





(3) 什么是隐蔽重定向?

隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 是一个计算机网络安全漏洞。这个漏洞发布于 2014年5月。漏洞成因是网络应用软件对跳转到合作者的跳转没有充分过滤。这个漏洞经常利用第三方网站 (包括合作网站) 的公开重定向 (Open Redirect) 或者 跨站脚本漏洞 (XSS – Cross-site Scripting) 问题。

隐蔽重定向也对单点登录 (single sign-on) 有影响。最初发布的是对两款常用登录软件 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 的影响。黑客可以利用真实的网站进行网络钓鱼,从而窃取用户敏感信息。几乎所用提供 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 服务的网站都被影响。隐蔽重定向还可以和 跨站请求伪造 (CSRF – Cross-site Request Forgery) 一起利用。它的 scipID ID 是 13185; OSVDB ID 是 106567; Bugtraq ID 是 67196; X-Force ID 是 93031。





 

相关文章:
http://tetraph.com/security/covert-redirect/alibaba-alipays-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-information-leakage-open-redirect/
http://securityrelated.blogspot.com/2014/07/alibaba-alipay-bug.html
http://whitehatpost.lofter.com/post/1cc773c8_72e71f9
https://vulnerabilitypost.wordpress.com/2014/06/02/alibaba-alipay-exploit/
https://twitter.com/yangziyou/status/614368472705818624
blog.163.com/tetraph/blog/static/2346030512014471384217
http://whitehatview.tumblr.com/post/119488487851/securitypost-itinfotech-falha-de-seguranca#notes
http://computerobsess.blogspot.com/2014/07/alibaba-alipay-bug.html
https://computertechhut.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/alibaba-alipay-exploit/
http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/covert-redirect/alibaba-alipays-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-information-leakage-open-redirect/