CVE-2014-8489 Ping Identity Corporation “PingFederate 6.10.1 SP Endpoints” Dest Redirect Privilege Escalation Security Vulnerability

CVE-2014-8489 Ping Identity Corporation “PingFederate 6.10.1 SP Endpoints” Dest Redirect Privilege Escalation Security Vulnerability

 

Exploit Title: “Ping Identity Corporation” “PingFederate 6.10.1 SP Endpoints” Dest Redirect Privilege Escalation Security Vulnerability
Product: PingFederate 6.10.1 SP Endpoints
Vendor: Ping Identity Corporation
Vulnerable Versions: 6.10.1
Tested Version: 6.10.1
Advisory Publication: Dec 09, 2014
Latest Update: Dec 09, 2014
Vulnerability Type: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site [CWE-601]
CVE Reference: CVE-2014-8489
CVSS v2 Base Score: 6.4 (MEDIUM) (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N) (legend)
Impact Subscore: 4.9
Exploitability Subscore: 10.0
Credit: Wang Jing [SPMS, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore]

 

Advisory Details

 

(1) Product:
“PingFederate is a best-of-breed Internet-identity security platform that implements multiple standards-based protocols to provide cross-domain single sign-on (SSO) and user-attribute exchange, as well as support for identity-enabled Web Services and cross-domain user provisioning.”

 

(2) Vulnerability Details:
PingFederate 6.10.1 SP Endpoints is vulnerable to Dest Redirect Privilege Escalation attacks.
The security vulnerability occurs at “/startSSO.ping?” page with “&TargetResource” parameter.

 

References:

 

Falha de segurança afeta logins de Facebook, Google e Microsoft

internet connection concept, 3d generated image

Um estudante de PHD de Singapura, Wang Jing, identificou a falha, chamada de “Covert Redirect”, que consegue usar domínios reais de sites para verificação de páginas de login falsas, enganando os internautas.

 

Os cibercriminosos podem criar links maliciosos para abrir janelas pop-up do Facebook pedindo que o tal aplicativo seja autorizado. Caso seja realizada esta sincronização, os dados pessoais dos usuários serão passados para os hackers.

 

Wang afirma que já entrou em contato com o Facebook, porém recebeu uma resposta de que “entende os riscos de estar associado ao OAuth 2.0″ e que corrigir a falha “é algo que não pode ser feito por enquanto”.

 

O Google afirmou que o problema está sendo rastreado, o LinkedIn publicou nota em que garante que já tomou medidas para evitar que a falha seja explorada, e a Microsoft negou que houvesse vulnerabilidade em suas páginas, apenas nas de terceiros.

 

A recomendação do descobridor da falha para os internautas é que evitem fazer o login com dados de confirmação de Facebook, Google ou qualquer outro serviço sem terem total certeza de que estão em um ambiente seguro.

 

 

Especialistas: erro é difícil de corrigir

O site CNET ouviu dois especialistas em segurança virtual sobre o assunto. Segundo Jeremiah Grossman, fundador e CEO interino da WhiteHat Security, afirma que a falha “não é fácil de corrigir”. Segundo Chris Wysopal, diretor da Veracode, a falha pode enganar muita gente.

 

“A confiança que os usuários dão ao Facebook e outros serviços que usam OAuth pode tornar mais fácil para os hackers enganarem as pessoas para que elas acabem dando suas informações pessoais a ele”, afirma Wsyopal.

 

 

 

notícias relacionadas:

Tencent QQ OAuth 2.0 Service Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)

qq-messenger-53

 

Tencent QQ OAuth 2.0 Service Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)

 

 

 

(1) Domain:
qq.com

 

 

“Tencent QQ, popularly known as QQ, is an instant messaging software service developed by Chinese company Tencent Holdings Limited. QQ also offers a variety of services, including online social games, music, shopping, microblogging, movies, platform of games and group and voice chat. As of January 2015, there are 829 million active QQ accounts, with a peak of 176.4 million simultaneous online QQ users.” (Wikipedia)

 

 

 

 

(2) Vulnerability Description:

Tencent QQ web application has a computer security problem. Hacker can exploit it by Covert Redirect cyber attacks.

 

 

The vulnerabilities can be attacked without user login. Tests were performed on Microsoft IE (10.0.9200.16750) of Windows 8, Mozilla Firefox (34.0) & Google Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0 ubuntu0.14.04.1.1064 (64-bit) of Ubuntu (14.04),Apple Safari 6.1.6 of Mac OS X Lion 10.7.

 

 

 

 

(2.1) Vulnerability Detail:

QQ’s SSO system is susceptible to Attacks. More specifically, the authentication of parameter “&redirct_uri” in SSO system is insufficient. It can be misused to design Open Redirect Attacks to QQ.

 

At the same time, it can be used to collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users by using the following parameters (sensitive information is contained in HTTP header.),

“&response_type”=sensitive_info,token…

“&scope”=get_user_info%2Cadd_share…

 

It increases the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks to third-party websites, too.

 

 

The vulnerabilities occurs at page “/oauth/show?” with parameter “&redirect_uri”, e.g.
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/show?which=ConfirmPage&display=pc&client_id=100261282&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fuc.cjcp.com.cn%2Findex.php%3Fm%3DUser%26a%3Dcallback%26type%3Dqq&response_type=code&scope=get_user_info%2Cadd_share [1]

 

 

Before acceptance of third-party application:

 

When a logged-in QQ user clicks the URL ([1]) above, he/she will be asked for consent as in whether to allow a third-party website to receive his/her information. If the user clicks OK, he/she will be then redirected to the URL assigned to the parameter “&redirect_uri”.

 

If a user has not logged onto QQ and clicks the URL ([1]) above, the same situation will happen upon login.

 

 

After acceptance of third-party application:

 

A logged-in QQ user would no longer be asked for consent and could be redirected to a webpage controlled by the attacker when he/she clicks the URL ([1]).

 

For a user who has not logged in, the attack could still be completed after a pop-up page that prompts him/her to log in.

 

 

 

(2.1.1) QQ would normally allow all the URLs that belong to the domain of an authorized third-party website. However, these URLs could be prone to manipulation. For example, the “&redirect_uri” parameter in the URLs is supposed to be set by the third-party websites, but an attacker could change its value to make Attacks.

 

Hence, a user could be redirected from QQ to a vulnerable URL in that domain first and later be redirected from this vulnerable site to a malicious site unwillingly. This is as if the user is redirected from QQ directly. The number of QQ’s SSO client websites is so huge that such Attacks could be commonplace.

 

Before acceptance of the third-party application, QQ’s SSO system makes the redirects appear more trustworthy and could potentially increase the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks of third-party website.

 

Once the user accepts the application, the attackers could completely bypass QQ’s authentication system and attack more easily.

 

Used one of webpages for the following tests. The webpage is “https://dailymem.wordpress.com/“. Can suppose it is malicious and contains code that collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users.

 

Below is an example of a vulnerable third-party domain:
cjcp.com.cn

 

Vulnerable URL in this domain:
http://uc.cjcp.com.cn/?m=user&a=otherLogin&type=qq&furl=http%3A%2F%2Ftetraph.com%2Fessayjeans%2Fseasons%2F%25E7%25A2%258E%25E5%25A4%258F.html

 

Vulnerable URL from QQ that is related to cjcp.com.cn:
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/show?which=Login&display=pc&client_id=100261282&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fuc.cjcp.com.cn%2Findex.php%3Fm%3DUser%26a%3Dcallback%26type%3Dqq&response_type=code&scope=get_user_info%2Cadd_share

 

POC:
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/show?which=Login&display=pc&client_id=100261282&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fuc.cjcp.com.cn%2F%3Fm%3Duser%26a%3DotherLogin%26type%3Dqq%26furl%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ftetraph.com%252Fessayjeans%252Fseasons%252F%2525E7%2525A2%25258E%2525E5%2525A4%25258F.html&response_type=code&scope=get_user_info%2Cadd_share [2]

 

 

 

 

(2.2) Another method for attackers.

Attackers enter the following URL in browser,
http://uc.cjcp.com.cn/?m=user&a=otherLogin&type=qq&furl=http%3A%2F%2Ftetraph.com%2Fessayjeans%2Fseasons%2F%25E7%25A2%258E%25E5%25A4%258F.html

 

Then, attackers can get URL below,
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/show?which=Login&display=pc&client_id=100261282&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fuc.cjcp.com.cn%2Findex.php%3Fm%3DUser%26a%3Dcallback%26type%3Dqq&response_type=code&scope=get_user_info%2Cadd_share [3]

 

If users click URL [3], the same thing will happen as URL [2].

 

 

 

(2.3) The following URLs have the same vulnerabilities.
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/qzoneoauth_authorize?oauth_consumer_key=209717&oauth_token=14921471022138330625&oauth_callback=http://user.nipic.com/api/login/qq/callback.asp

https://graph.qq.com/oauth2.0/authorize?client_id=100246654&redirect_uri=http://youxi.baidu.com/tp/QQAuth.jsp&response_type=code

https://open.t.qq.com/cgi-bin/oauth2/authorize?client_id=801132217&response_type=code&redirect_uri=http://passport.tianya.cn/login/txwb.do

 

 

POC Video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lxaX9xvUfE

 

 

Blog Detail:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/tencent-qq-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html

 

 



 

(3) What is Covert Redirect?

Covert Redirect is a class of security bugs disclosed in May 2014. It is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without sufficient validation. This often makes use of Open Redirect and XSS (Cross-site Scripting) vulnerabilities in third-party applications.

 

Covert Redirect is also related to single sign-on, such as OAuth and OpenID. Hacker may use it to steal users’ sensitive information. Almost all OAuth 2.0 and OpenID providers worldwide are affected. Covert Redirect can work together with CSRF (Cross-site Request Forgery) as well.



 

Discover and Reporter:
Jing Wang, Division of Mathematical Sciences (MAS), School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (SPMS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. (@justqdjing)
http://tetraph.com/wangjing/

 

 

 

 

 

Related Articles:
http://tetraph.com/security/covert-redirect/tencent-qq-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect
https://twitter.com/yangziyou/status/615125849306632193
https://biyiniao.wordpress.com/2014/08/28/qq-bugs/
http://diebiyi.com/articles/security/covert-redirect/tencent-qq-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect
http://frenchairing.blogspot.com/2014/08/tencent-qq-exploit.html
http://tetraph.blog.163.com/blog/static/23460305120144631154854/
http://guyuzui.lofter.com/post/1ccdcda4_6f0b982
http://mathpost.tumblr.com/post/119490927560/itinfotech-id-oauth
http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/covert-redirect/tencent-qq-oauth-2-0
https://computertechhut.wordpress.com/2014/08/28/tencent-qq-bug/
http://computerobsess.blogspot.com/2014/05/tencent-qq-bug.html

 

 

 

 

===========

 

 

 


腾讯 QQ 网站 OAuth 2.0 隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络安全漏洞 (信息泄漏 & 公开重定向)





(1) 域名:
qq.com

 

 

” 腾讯QQ(简称“QQ”)是腾讯公司开发的一款基于Internet的即时通信(IM)软件。腾讯QQ支持在线聊天、视频通话、点对点断点续传文件、共享 文件、网络硬盘、自定义面板、QQ邮箱等多种功能,并可与多种通讯终端相连。2015年,QQ继续为用户创造良好的通讯体验!其标志是一只戴着红色围巾的 小企鹅。目前QQ已经覆盖Microsoft Windows、OS X、Android、iOS、Windows Phone等多种主流平台” (百度百科)

 

 

 

 

 

(2) 漏洞描述:

腾讯 QQ 网站有有一个计算机安全问题,黑客可以对它进行隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络攻击。

 

 

这 个漏洞不需要用户登录,测试是基于微软 Windows 8 的 IE (10.0.9200.16750); Ubuntu (14.04) 的 Mozilla 火狐 (Firefox 34.0) 和 谷歌 Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0; 以及苹果 OS X Lion 10.7 的 Safari 6.16。

 

 

 

 

(2.1) 漏洞细节:

QQ 的 SSO 系统可能遭到攻击。更确切地说, QQ 对 SSO 系统的 parameter “&redirect_uri“ 验证不够充分。可以用来构造对 QQ 的 URL跳转 攻击。

 

 

 

与此同时,这个漏洞可以用下面的参数来收集第三方 App 和 用户 的敏感信息(敏感信息包含在 HTTP header里),

“&response_type”=sensitive_info,token…

“&scope”=get_user_info%2Cadd_share…

 

 

它也增加了对第三方网站 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。

 

 

漏洞地点 “/oauth/show?”,参数”&redirect_uri”, e.g.
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/show?which=ConfirmPage&display=pc&client_id=100261282&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fuc.cjcp.com.cn%2Findex.php%3Fm%3DUser%26a%3Dcallback%26type%3Dqq&response_type=code&scope=get_user_info%2Cadd_share [1]

 

 

 

同意三方 App 前:

当一个已经登录的 QQ 用户点击上面的 URL ([1]), 对话框会询问他是否接受第三方 App 接收他的信息。如果同意,他会被跳转到 参数 “&redirect_uri” 的 URL。

 

 

如果没有登录的 QQ 用户点击 URL ([1]), 他登录后会发生同样的事情。

 

 

 

同意三方 App 后:

已经登录的 QQ 用户 不会再被询问是否接受 三方 App。当他点击 URL ([1]) 时,他会被直接跳转到攻击者控制的页面。

 

 

如果 QQ 用户没有登录,攻击依然可以在要求他登录的QQ的对话框被确认后完成(这个过程不会提示任何和三方 App 有关的内容)。

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2.1.1) QQ 一般会允许属于已被验证过得三方 App domain 的所有 URLs。 然而,这些 URLs 可以被操控。比如,参数 “&redirect_uri” 是被三方 App 设置的,但攻击者可以修改此参数的值。

 

 

因此,QQ 用户意识不到他会被先从 QQ 跳转到第三方 App 的网页,然后从此网页跳转到有害的网页。这与从 QQ 直接跳转到有害网页是一样的。

 

 

因为 QQ 的 SSO 客户很多,这样的攻击可以很常见。

 

 

在同意三方 App 之前,QQ 的 SSO 让用户更容易相信被跳转的页面是安全的。这增加了三方 App 被 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。

 

 

同意三方 App 后, 攻击者可以完全绕过 QQ 的 URL跳转 验证系统。

 

 

用了一个页面进行了测试, 页面是 “http://whitehatpostlike.lofter.com/“. 可以假定它是有害的,并且含有收集三方 App 和用户敏感信息的 code。

 

 

下面是一个有漏洞的三方 domain:
cjcp.com.cn

 

 

这个 domain 有漏洞的 URL:
http://uc.cjcp.com.cn/?m=user&a=otherLogin&type=qq&furl=http%3A%2F%2Ftetraph.com%2Fessayjeans%2Fseasons%2F%25E7%25A2%258E%25E5%25A4%258F.html

 

 

QQ 与 cjcp.com.cn 有关的有漏洞的 URL:
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/show?which=Login&display=pc&client_id=100261282&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fuc.cjcp.com.cn%2Findex.php%3Fm%3DUser%26a%3Dcallback%26type%3Dqq&response_type=code&scope=get_user_info%2Cadd_share

 

 

POC:
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/show?which=Login&display=pc&client_id=100261282&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fuc.cjcp.com.cn%2F%3Fm%3Duser%26a%3DotherLogin%26type%3Dqq%26furl%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ftetraph.com%252Fessayjeans%252Fseasons%252F%2525E7%2525A2%25258E%2525E5%2525A4%25258F.html&response_type=code&scope=get_user_info%2Cadd_share [2]

 

 

 

 

(2.2) 攻击的另一个方法.


攻击者在浏览器输入 URL,
http://uc.cjcp.com.cn/?m=user&a=otherLogin&type=qq&furl=http%3A%2F%2Ftetraph.com%2Fessayjeans%2Fseasons%2F%25E7%25A2%258E%25E5%25A4%258F.html

 


然后,攻击者可以得到 URL,
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/show?which=Login&display=pc&client_id=100261282&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fuc.cjcp.com.cn%2Findex.php%3Fm%3DUser%26a%3Dcallback%26type%3Dqq&response_type=code&scope=get_user_info%2Cadd_share [3]

 

如果用户点击 URL [3], 发生的事情和 URL [2] 一样.

 

 

 

 

(2.3)下面的 URLs 有同样的漏洞.
http://openapi.qzone.qq.com/oauth/qzoneoauth_authorize?oauth_consumer_key=209717&oauth_token=14921471022138330625&oauth_callback=http://user.nipic.com/api/login/qq/callback.asp

 

https://graph.qq.com/oauth2.0/authorize?client_id=100246654&redirect_uri=http://youxi.baidu.com/tp/QQAuth.jsp&response_type=code

 

 

https://open.t.qq.com/cgi-bin/oauth2/authorize?client_id=801132217&response_type=code&redirect_uri=http://passport.tianya.cn/login/txwb.do

 

 

 

POC 视频:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lxaX9xvUfE

 

 

博客细节:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/tencent-qq-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(3) 什么是隐蔽重定向?

隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 是一个计算机网络安全漏洞。这个漏洞发布于 2014年5月。漏洞成因是网络应用软件对跳转到合作者的跳转没有充分过滤。这个漏洞经常利用第三方网站 (包括合作网站) 的公开重定向 (Open Redirect) 或者 跨站脚本漏洞 (XSS – Cross-site Scripting) 问题。

 

隐蔽重定向也对单点登录 (single sign-on) 有影响。最初发布的是对两款常用登录软件 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 的影响。黑客可以利用真实的网站进行网络钓鱼,从而窃取用户敏感信息。几乎所用提供 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 服务的网站都被影响。隐蔽重定向也可以和 跨站请求伪造 (CSRF – Cross-site Request Forgery) 一起利用。

 

 

 

 



Google Online Service OpenID Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)

google2

 

 

Google Online Service OpenID Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)



(1) Domain:
google.com

 

“Google has been estimated to run more than one million servers in data centers around the world (as of 2007). It processes over one billion search requests and about 24 petabytes of user-generated data each day (as of 2009). In December 2013, Alexa listed google.com as the most visited website in the world. Numerous Google sites in other languages figure in the top one hundred, as do several other Google-owned sites such as YouTube and Blogger. Its market dominance has led to prominent media coverage, including criticism of the company over issues such as search neutrality, copyright, censorship, and privacy.” (Wikipedia)

 

 

 

 

 

(2) Vulnerability Description:

Google web application has a computer security problem. Hacker can exploit it by Covert Redirect cyber attacks.

 



The vulnerabilities can be attacked without user login. Tests were performed on Microsoft IE (10.0.9200.16750) of Windows 8, Mozilla Firefox (34.0) & Google Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0 ubuntu0.14.04.1.1064 (64-bit) of Ubuntu (14.04),Apple Safari 6.1.6 of Mac OS X Lion 10.7.

 

 

 


(2.1) Vulnerability Detail:

Google’s OpenID system is susceptible to Attacks. More specifically, the authentication of parameter “&openid.return_to” in OpenID system is insufficient. It can be misused to design Open Redirect Attacks to Google.

 

It increases the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks to third-party websites, too.

 

Google replies “Thanks for the reporting this issue. we’re already tracking[the vulnerability] …”

 

 

The vulnerabilities occurs at page “/accounts/o8/ud?” with parameter “&openid.return_to”, e.g.
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud?openid.ns=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0&openid.claimed_id=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0%2Fidentifier_select&openid.identity=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0%2Fidentifier_select&openid.return_to=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rhogroupee.com%2FopenIdRp%3Fredirect%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.rhogroupee.com%252Fjoin%252Fcontext%252FGENERAL%252Fredirect%252Fhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.tetraph.com%25252Fessayjeans%25252Fpoems%25252Fdistance.html&openid.realm=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rhogroupee.com%2FopenIdRp&openid.aOpenIDc_handle=1.AMlYA9UWc8Nk_QfiFEpKcE9A7qm0ErEkNLgQcbOwTR_aLdEyFS4ybtZQ_V9-4ARxUqsGIpPFtRd9Mw&openid.mode=checkid_setup&openid.ns.ext1=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fextensions%2Fsreg%2F1.1&openid.ext1.optional=nickname%2Cemail%2CemailVerified%2Cdob%2Cgender%2Ccountry&openid.ns.sreg=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fsreg%2F1.0&openid.sreg.optional=nickname%2Cemail%2CemailVerified%2Cdob%2Cgender%2Ccountry&openid.ns.ext3=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fsrv%2Fax%2F1.0&openid.ext3.mode=fetch_request&openid.ext3.type.Username=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2FnamePerson%2Ffriendly&openid.ext3.type.Email=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2Fcontact%2Femail&openid.ext3.type.Birth+date=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2FbirthDate&openid.ext3.type.Gender=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2Fperson%2Fgender&openid.ext3.type.Country=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2Fcontact%2Fcountry%2Fhome&openid.ext3.required=Username%2CEmail%2CBirth+date%2CGender%2CCountry [1]

 

 

Before acceptance of third-party application:

 

When a logged-in Google user clicks the URL ([1]) above, he/she will be asked for consent as in whether to allow a third-party website to receive his/her information. If the user clicks OK, he/she will be then redirected to the URL assigned to the parameter “&openid.return_to”.

 

If a user has not logged onto Google and clicks the URL ([1]) above, the same situation will happen upon login.

 

After acceptance of third-party application:

 

A logged-in Google user would no longer be asked for consent and could be redirected to a webpage controlled by the attacker when he/she clicks the URL ([1]).

 

For a user who has not logged in, the attack could still be completed after a pop-up page that prompts him/her to log in.

 

 

 

 

(2.1.1) Google would normally allow all the URLs that belong to the domain of an authorized third-party website. However, these URLs could be prone to manipulation. For example, the “&openid.return_to” parameter in the URLs is supposed to be set by the third-party websites, but an attacker could change its value to make Attacks.

 

Hence, a user could be redirected from Google to a vulnerable URL in that domain first and later be redirected from this vulnerable site to a malicious site unwillingly. This is as if the user is redirected from Google directly. The number of Google’s OpenID client websites is so huge that such Attacks could be commonplace.

 

Before acceptance of the third-party application, Google’s OpenID system makes the redirects appear more trustworthy and could potentially increase the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks of third-party website.

 

Once the user accepts the application, the attackers could completely bypass Google’s authentication system and attack more easily.

 

It might be of Google’s interest to patch up against such attacks.

 

 

 

 

(2.2) Use one of webpages for the following tests. The webpage is “http://xingzhehong.lofter.com/“. Can suppose it is malicious.

 

Below is an example of a vulnerable third-party domain:
rhogroupee.com

 

 

Vulnerable URL in this domain:
http://www.rhogroupee.com/join/context/GENERAL/redirect/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tetraph.com%2Fessayjeans%2Fpoems%2Fdistance.html

 

 

Vulnerable URL from Google that is related to rhogroupee.com:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud?openid.ns=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0&openid.claimed_id=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0%2Fidentifier_select&openid.identity=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0%2Fidentifier_select&openid.return_to=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rhogroupee.com%2FopenIdRp%3Fredirect%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.rhogroupee.com%252Fuser-social-network-login%252FauthProvider%252F10%252Fredirect%252Fhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.rhogroupee.com%25252Fabout&openid.realm=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rhogroupee.com%2FopenIdRp&openid.aOpenIDc_handle=1.AMlYA9UWc8Nk_QfiFEpKcE9A7qm0ErEkNLgQcbOwTR_aLdEyFS4ybtZQ_V9-4ARxUqsGIpPFtRd9Mw&openid.mode=checkid_setup&openid.ns.ext1=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fextensions%2Fsreg%2F1.1&openid.ext1.optional=nickname%2Cemail%2CemailVerified%2Cdob%2Cgender%2Ccountry&openid.ns.sreg=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fsreg%2F1.0&openid.sreg.optional=nickname%2Cemail%2CemailVerified%2Cdob%2Cgender%2Ccountry&openid.ns.ext3=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fsrv%2Fax%2F1.0&openid.ext3.mode=fetch_request&openid.ext3.type.Username=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2FnamePerson%2Ffriendly&openid.ext3.type.Email=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2Fcontact%2Femail&openid.ext3.type.Birth+date=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2FbirthDate&openid.ext3.type.Gender=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2Fperson%2Fgender&openid.ext3.type.Country=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2Fcontact%2Fcountry%2Fhome&openid.ext3.required=Username%2CEmail%2CBirth+date%2CGender%2CCountry

 

 

POC:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud?openid.ns=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0&openid.claimed_id=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0%2Fidentifier_select&openid.identity=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0%2Fidentifier_select&openid.return_to=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rhogroupee.com%2FopenIdRp%3Fredirect%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.rhogroupee.com%252Fjoin%252Fcontext%252FGENERAL%252Fredirect%252Fhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.tetraph.com%25252Fessayjeans%25252Fpoems%25252Fdistance.html&openid.realm=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rhogroupee.com%2FopenIdRp&openid.aOpenIDc_handle=1.AMlYA9UWc8Nk_QfiFEpKcE9A7qm0ErEkNLgQcbOwTR_aLdEyFS4ybtZQ_V9-4ARxUqsGIpPFtRd9Mw&openid.mode=checkid_setup&openid.ns.ext1=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fextensions%2Fsreg%2F1.1&openid.ext1.optional=nickname%2Cemail%2CemailVerified%2Cdob%2Cgender%2Ccountry&openid.ns.sreg=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fsreg%2F1.0&openid.sreg.optional=nickname%2Cemail%2CemailVerified%2Cdob%2Cgender%2Ccountry&openid.ns.ext3=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fsrv%2Fax%2F1.0&openid.ext3.mode=fetch_request&openid.ext3.type.Username=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2FnamePerson%2Ffriendly&openid.ext3.type.Email=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2Fcontact%2Femail&openid.ext3.type.Birth+date=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2FbirthDate&openid.ext3.type.Gender=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2Fperson%2Fgender&openid.ext3.type.Country=http%3A%2F%2Fschema.openid.net%2Fcontact%2Fcountry%2Fhome&openid.ext3.required=Username%2CEmail%2CBirth+date%2CGender%2CCountry

 

 

 

 

(2.3) The following URL have the same vulnerabilities.
https://accounts.google.com/o/openid2/auth?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0&openid.claimed_id=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/identifier_select&openid.identity=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/identifier_select&openid.return_to=http://www.rhogroupee.com/openIdRp?redirect%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.rhogroupee.com%252Fuser-social-network-login%252FauthProvider%252F10%252Fredirect%252Fhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.rhogroupee.com&openid.realm=http://www.rhogroupee.com/openIdRp&openid.aOpenIDc_handle=1.AMlYA9VvMT-wTbwpTyi–6hxkiyJYb7Oou8Wt0nqDPzqfNZBqTsNOXWhVorwkAAIZmnQXwswhZYZYQ&openid.mode=checkid_setup&openid.ns.ext1=http://openid.net/extensions/sreg/1.1&openid.ext1.optional=nickname,email,emailVerified,dob,gender,country&openid.ns.sreg=http://openid.net/sreg/1.0&openid.sreg.optional=nickname,email,emailVerified,dob,gender,country&openid.ns.ext3=http://openid.net/srv/ax/1.0&openid.ext3.mode=fetch_request&openid.ext3.type.Username=http://schema.openid.net/namePerson/friendly&openid.ext3.type.Email=http://schema.openid.net/contact/email&openid.ext3.type.Birth+date=http://schema.openid.net/birthDate&openid.ext3.type.Gender=http://schema.openid.net/person/gender&openid.ext3.type.Country=http://schema.openid.net/contact/country/home&openid.ext3.required=Username,Email,Birth+date,Gender,Country

 

 

POC Video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GyNGBuHNoJ0

 

Blog Detail:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/google-openid-covert-redirect.html





(3) What is Covert Redirect?

Covert Redirect is a class of security bugs disclosed in May 2014. It is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without sufficient validation. This often makes use of Open Redirect and XSS (Cross-site Scripting) vulnerabilities in third-party applications.

 

Covert Redirect is also related to single sign-on. It is known by its influence on OAuth and OpenID. Hacker may use it to steal users’ sensitive information. Almost all OAuth 2.0 and OpenID providers worldwide are affected. Covert Redirect can work together with CSRF (Cross-site Request Forgery) as well. After Covert Redirect was published, it is kept in some common databases such as SCIP, OSVDB, Bugtraq, and X-Force. Its scipID is 13185, while OSVDB reference number is 106567. Bugtraq ID: 67196. X-Force reference number is 93031.



 

Discover and Reporter:
Wang Jing, Division of Mathematical Sciences (MAS), School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (SPMS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
(@justqdjing)
http://tetraph.com/wangjing/









Related Articles:
http://tetraph.com/security/covert-redirect/google-openid-covert-redirect-vulnerability/
https://twitter.com/tetraphibious/status/559169163394940929
https://hackertopic.wordpress.com/2014/08/06/google-service-exploit/
http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/covert-redirect/google-openid-covert-redirect-vulnerability/
http://tetraph.blog.163.com/blog/static/23460305120144385547287/
http://securitypost.tumblr.com/post/119439859067/itinfotech-id-oauth
http://securityrelated.blogspot.com/2014/06/google-web-service-bug.html
http://whitehatpost.lofter.com/post/1cc773c8_706b637
https://tetraph.wordpress.com/2014/07/11/google-service-exploit/
http://computerobsess.blogspot.com/2014/06/google-web-service-bug.html

Godaddy Online Website Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs Based on Google.com

StudyShare_GoDaddy2

 

Godaddy Online Website Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs Based on Google.com

 

(1) Domain:
godaddy.com

 

 

“GoDaddy is a publicly traded Internet domain registrar and web hosting company. As of 2014, GoDaddy was said to have had more than 59 million domain names under management, making it the world’s largest ICANN-accredited registrar. It serves more than 12 million customers and employs more than 4,000 people. The company is known for its celebrity spokespeople, Super Bowl ads and as being an online provider for small businesses. In addition to a postseason college football bowl game, it sponsors NASCAR. It has been involved in several controversies related to security and privacy. In addition to domain registration and hosting, GoDaddy also sells e-business related software and services.” (Wikipedia)

 

 

 

 

 

(2) Vulnerability Description:
Godaddy web application has a computer security problem. Hacker can exploit it by Covert Redirect cyber attacks.


The vulnerabilities can be attacked without user login. Tests were performed on Microsoft IE (10.0.9200.16750) of Windows 8, Mozilla Firefox (34.0) & Google Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0 ubuntu0.14.04.1.1064 (64-bit) of Ubuntu (14.04),Apple Safari 6.1.6 of Mac OS X Lion 10.7.

 

The vulnerability occurs at “redirect.aspx?” page with “&target” parameter, i.e.
http://img.godaddy.com/redirect.aspx?ci=1161&target=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

 

 

 

(2.1) When a user is redirected from Godaddy to another site, Godaddy will check whether the redirected URL belongs to domains Godaddy’s whitelist, e.g.
google.com
apple.com

 

If this is true, the redirection will be allowed.

 

However, if the URLs in a redirected domain have open URL redirection vulnerabilities themselves, a user could be redirected from Godaddy to a vulnerable URL in that domain first and later be redirected from this vulnerable site to a malicious site. This is as if being redirected from Godaddy directly.

 

One of the vulnerable domain is,
google.com

 

 

 

(2.2) Use one of webpages for the following tests. The webpage address is “http://diebiyi.com/articles/“. Can suppose that this page is malicious.

 

Vulnerable URL:
http://img.godaddy.com/redirect.aspx?ci=1161&target=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.godaddy.com

 

POC:
http://img.godaddy.com/redirect.aspx?ci=1161&target=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Faccounts%2FLogout%3Fservice%3Dwise%26continue%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fgoogleads.g.doubleclick.net%252Faclk%253Fsa%253DL%2526ai%253DCtHoIVxn3UvjLOYGKiAeelIHIBfLQnccEAAAQASAAUNTx5Pf4_____wFgvwWCARdjYS1wdWItMDQ2NjU4MjEwOTU2NjUzMsgBBOACAKgDAaoE5AFP0NHr5cHwFmWgKNs6HNTPVk7TWSV-CDHX83dKdGSWJ2ADoZNIxUHZwjAODRyDY_7nVtpuqSLOTef4xzVxDQ2U22MNbGak33Ur7i2jDB8LdYt9TbC3ifsXmklY5jl3Zpq4_lP7wagVfjt0–tNPPGTR96NGbxgPvfHMq9ZsTXpjhc_lPlnyGjlWzF8yn437iaxhGRwYLt_CymifLO2YaJPkCm9nLpONtUM-mstUSpKQrP2VjjaZkbDtuK0naLLBV37aYEY4TzWQi8fQGN47z4XgpinBCna91zQayZjn2wxccDCl0zgBAGgBhU%2526num%253D0%2526sig%253DAOD64_3Qi4qG3CRVHRI5AHSkSGuL7HJqSA%2526client%253Dca-pub-0466582109566532%2526adurl%253Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.tetraph.com%252Fcontact.html

 

 

 

Blog Detail:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/godaddy-covert-redirect-vulnerability.html



 

 

 

(3) What is Covert Redirect?
Covert Redirect is a class of security bugs disclosed in May 2014. It is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without sufficient validation. This often makes use of Open Redirect and XSS (Cross-site Scripting) vulnerabilities in third-party applications.

Covert Redirect is also related to single sign-on, such as OAuth and OpenID. Hacker may use it to steal users’ sensitive information. Almost all OAuth 2.0 and OpenID providers worldwide are affected. Covert Redirect can work together with CSRF (Cross-site Request Forgery) as well.

 

 

 

Discover and Reporter:
Jing Wang, Division of Mathematical Sciences (MAS), School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (SPMS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
(@justqdjing)
http://tetraph.com/wangjing/








Related Articles:
https://twitter.com/tetraphibious/status/559167679353720834
http://tetraph.com/security/covert-redirect/godaddy-covert-redirect-vulnerability-based-on-google/
http://tetraph.blog.163.com/blog/static/234603051201444111919171/
http://whitehatpost.lofter.com/post/1cc773c8_706b6bf
http://japanbroad.blogspot.jp/2015/06/godaddy-bug.html
http://securitypost.tumblr.com/post/119439859067/itinfotech-id-oauth
https://infoswift.wordpress.com/2014/07/02/godaddy-hack/
http://germancast.blogspot.de/2014/06/godaddy-exploit.html
http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/covert-redirect/godaddy-covert-redirect-vulnerability-based-on-google/
https://mathfas.wordpress.com/2014/07/07/godaddy-hacking/